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Secure Communication with Unreliable Entanglement Assistance: Interception and Loss

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Motivation

Quantum information technology will potentially boost future 6G systems from both communication and computing perspectives.



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Motivation: Secure Quantum Communication



- Security poses a pivotal challenge in modern communication networks.
- Physical layer security leverages the inherent disturbance of the physical channel to ensure secure transmissions without relying on secret keys.
- Wiretap channel model: $\mathcal{N}_{A \rightarrow BE}$

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Motivation: Entanglement

Entanglement resources are instrumental in a wide variety of quantum network frameworks:

- Physical-layer security (device-independent QKD, quantum repeaters)
[Vazirani and Vidick 2014] [Yin et al. 2020][Pompili et al. 2021]
- Sensor networks [Xia et al. 2021]
- Communication rate
 - Without Security: Bennett et al. 1999
 - With Security: Qi et al. 2018
- ...

Unfortunately, entanglement is a fragile resource that is quickly degraded by decoherence effects.



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
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
Motivation: Entanglement (Cont.)

- In order to generate (heralded) entanglement in an optical communication system, the transmitter may prepare an entangled pair of photons locally, and then send one of them to the receiver.
- Such generation protocols are not always successful, as photons are easily absorbed before reaching the destination.



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- Therefore, practical systems require a back channel. In the case of failure, the protocol is to be repeated. The backward transmission may result in a delay, which in turn leads to a further degradation of the entanglement resources.
- In our previous work, Pereg et al. proposed a new principle of operation: The communication system operates on a rate that is adapted to the status of entanglement assistance. Hence, feedback and repetition are not required. [Pereg et al. 2023]
- Here, we consider secure communication in two scenarios:
 - Eve might steal the assistance - Interception model
 - The assistance might get lost to the environment - Passive model

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Reliability (very partial list):

- Unreliable channel
 - outage capacity [Ozarow, Shamai, and Wyner 1994]
 - automatic repeat request (ARQ) [Caire and Tuninetti 2001] [Steiner and Shamai 2008]
 - cognitive radio [Goldsmith et al. 2008]
 - Network connectivity [Simeone et al. 2012] [Sengupta and Tandon 2015]
- **Unreliable cooperation - Dynamic links** [Steinberg 2014]
 - cribbing encoders [Huleihel and Steinberg 2016]
 - conferencing decoders [Huleihel and Steinberg 2017] [Itzhak and Steinberg 2017] [Pereg and Steinberg 2020]

Related Work: Without Secrecy

Introduction
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Interception Model
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Passive Model
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Analysis
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Example
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Summary
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Fundamental Problem: Noiseless Channel



Classical Bit-Pipe

The capacity of a classical noiseless bit channel is

$$1 \frac{\text{classical bit}}{\text{transmission}}$$

Holevo Bound

The classical capacity of a noiseless qubit channel is

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Fundamental Problem: Noiseless Channel + Assistance



Theorem

The classical *common-randomness* (CR) capacity of a noiseless bit-pipe is

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
Theorem

The classical *entanglement-assisted* (EA) capacity of a noiseless qubit channel is

$$2 \frac{\text{classical bits}}{\text{transmission}}$$


Fundamental Problem: Noiseless Channel + EA

Superdense Coding



Fundamental Problem: Noiseless Channel + EA (Cont.)

Superdense Coding



Fundamental Problem: Noiseless Channel + EA (Cont.)

We consider transmission with unreliable EA:

The entangled resource may fail to reach Bob.

Extreme Strategies

1) Uncoded communication

- o Guaranteed rate: $R = 1$
- o Excess rate: $R' = 0$

2) Alice: Employ superdense encoder.

Bob: If EA is present, employ superdense decoder.
If EA is absent, abort.

Fundamental Problem: Noiseless Channel + EA (Cont.)

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Time Division

- Guaranteed rate: $R = 1 - \lambda$
- Excess rate: $R' = 2\lambda$

★ Is this optimal?

[Pereg et al. 2023]

- Time division is **optimal** for a noiseless channel
- Time division is **strictly sub-optimal** for depolarizing channels.

Fundamental Problem: Noiseless Channel + EA (Cont.)



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We consider a quantum wiretap channel in two settings involving **interception** or **loss**.

1) **Interception**: Eve may “steal” Bob’s entanglement resource.

- Inner bound (achievable rates)
- Degraded channels: regularized capacity formula

2) **Loss**: The resource could get lost to the environment.

- regularized capacity formula

- Both under semantic security and maximal error criterion

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- Observation: in the **interception** model, time division is not necessarily possible.
- Erasure channel: Time division is achievable and optimal in both models.
- Amplitude Damping Channel
 - **Interception**: Achievable region has discontinuous boundary.
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Interception Model: Definitions and Results

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Interception Model
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Passive Model
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Analysis
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
Example
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Summary
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Communication with Interception


There are two scenarios:

- Bob receives the entanglement assistance



Communication with Interception (Cont.)

- Eve intercepts the entangled resource




Coding with Unreliable Assistance (Cont.)



Communication Scheme (1)

Alice chooses two messages, m and m' , with rates R and R' .




Coding with Unreliable Assistance (Cont.)

Communication Scheme (2)

Input: Alice prepares $\rho_{A^n}^{m,m'} = \mathcal{F}^{m,m'}(\Psi_{G_1})$, and transmits A^n .

Output: Bob and Eve receive B^n, E^n respectively.




Coding with Unreliable Assistance (Cont.)



Decoding with Entanglement Assistance

If Bob has the EA, he performs a measurement \mathcal{D} to estimate m, m' .




Coding with Unreliable Assistance (Cont.)



Decoding without Assistance


If Eve has sabotaged the entanglement assistance, Bob performs a measurement \mathcal{D}^* to estimate m alone.



Coding with Unreliable Assistance (Cont.)

Decoding without Assistance

If Eve has sabotaged the entanglement assistance, Bob performs a measurement \mathcal{D}^* to estimate m alone. **Nevertheless, secrecy needs to be maintained!**



Coding with Unreliable Assistance (Cont.)

Capacity Region

- (R, R') is achievable with unreliable entanglement assistance under interception if there exists a sequence of $(2^{nR}, 2^{nR'}, n)$ codes such that

$$\max_{m, m'} \Pr(\text{error} | m, m', \text{Scenario 1}), \Pr(\text{error} | m, m', \text{Scenario 2}) \rightarrow 0,$$

$$\max_{m, m'} \frac{1}{2} \left\| \rho_{E^n G_2^n}^{m, m'} - \theta_{E^n G_2^n} \right\|_1 \rightarrow 0$$

as $n \rightarrow \infty$.

Indistinguishability includes the entangled resource!

- The capacity region $\mathcal{C}_{\text{int}}(\mathcal{N})$ is the closure of the set of achievable rate pairs.

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
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Definition

A quantum wiretap channel $\mathcal{N}_{A \rightarrow BE}$ is called **degraded** if there exists $\mathcal{P}_{B \rightarrow E}$ such that

$$\overline{\mathcal{N}}_{A \rightarrow E} = \mathcal{P}_{B \rightarrow E} \circ \mathcal{N}_{A \rightarrow B}$$



Main Result - Interception

Let $\mathcal{N}_{A \rightarrow BE}$ be a wiretap quantum channel. Define

$$\mathcal{R}_{\text{int}}(\mathcal{N}) \equiv \bigcup_{\rho_X, \varphi_{G_1 G_2}, \mathcal{F}^{(x)}} \left\{ (R, R') : \begin{aligned} R &\leq [I(X; B)_\omega - I(X; E G_2)_\omega]_+ \\ R' &\leq [I(G_2; B|X)_\omega - I(G_2; E|X)_\omega]_+ \end{aligned} \right\}$$

where the union is over all auxiliary variables $X \sim \rho_X$, bipartite states $\varphi_{G_1 G_2}$, and quantum encoding channels $\mathcal{F}_{G_1 \rightarrow A}^{(x)}$, with

$$\rho_{X G_2 A} = \sum_{x \in \mathcal{X}} \rho_X(x) |x\rangle\langle x| \otimes (\text{id} \otimes \mathcal{F}_{G_1 \rightarrow A}^{(x)})(\varphi_{G_1 G_2}),$$

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Note: The bound on the guaranteed rate includes the entanglement resource!

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Theorem 1

The region $\mathcal{R}_{\text{int}}(\mathcal{N})$ is achievable with unreliable entanglement assistance and semantic security under *interception*. That is, the capacity region is bounded by

$$\mathcal{C}_{\text{int}}(\mathcal{N}) \supseteq \mathcal{R}_{\text{int}}(\mathcal{N})$$

Theorem 2

Let $\mathcal{N}_{A \rightarrow BE}$ be a **degraded** quantum wiretap channel. The capacity region with unreliable entanglement assistance and semantic security under interception satisfies

$$C_{\text{int}}(\mathcal{N}) = \bigcup_{n=1}^{\infty} \frac{1}{n} \mathcal{R}_{\text{int}}(\mathcal{N}^{\otimes n})$$

- In the standard settings there is a single-letter formula for the degraded wiretap channels.
- Here, the analysis is more challenging, because of the term $I(X; EG_2)$.


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
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- The coding scheme is based on a quantum version of “Superposition Coding”:



- To achieve secrecy, we insert local randomness elements in the encoding of each message in order to confuse Eve.

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Passive Model: Definitions and Results

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Interception Model
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Passive Model
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Analysis
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
Example
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Communication with Passive Eve


There are two scenarios:

- Optimistic Scenario: Bob receives the entanglement assistance



Communication with Passive Eve (Cont.)


- Pessimistic Scenario: The assistance is lost to the environment.



- The coding scheme is similar to the one used in the interception model.

Communication with Passive Eve (Cont.)

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Main Result - Passive Eve

Let $\mathcal{N}_{A \rightarrow BE}$ be a wiretap quantum channel. Define

$$\mathcal{R}_{\text{passive}}(\mathcal{N}) \equiv \bigcup_{p_X, \varphi_{G_1 G_2}, \mathcal{F}^{(x)}} \left\{ (R, R') : \begin{array}{l} R \leq [I(X; B)_\omega - I(X; E)_\omega]_+ \\ R' \leq I(G_2; B|X)_\omega \end{array} \right\}$$

- Notice that as Eve is passive, the first bound no longer includes the entangled resource G_2 .
- Since Eve cannot intercept the assistance, Alice and Bob can generate a secret key and use one-time padding. Therefore, security is assured, and the term for R' does not include Eve's system.

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Theorem 3

Let $\mathcal{N}_{A \rightarrow BE}$ be a general quantum wiretap channel. the capacity region with unreliable entanglement assistance and a passive eavesdropper satisfies

$$C_{\text{passive}}(\mathcal{N}) = \bigcup_{n=1}^{\infty} \frac{1}{n} \mathcal{R}_{\text{passive}}(\mathcal{N}^{\otimes n})$$

Proof Outline

Introduction
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Interception Model
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Passive Model
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Analysis
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Example
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Summary
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Achievability Proof Outline

- Generate $2^{n(R+R_0)}$ independent sequences $x^n(m, k)$, i.i.d. $\sim p_X$, for $m \in \{1, \dots, 2^{nR}\}$, $k \in \{1, \dots, 2^{nR_0}\}$.
- Set the 'superdense coding unitary' $U(\gamma|x^n)$, using $2^{n(R'+R'_0)}$ conditionally independent sequences,

$$\{\gamma(m', k'|x^n(m, k))\}_{m' \in [1:2^{nR'}], k' \in [1:2^{nR'_0}]}$$

Achievability Proof Outline (Cont.)

- Suppose that Alice and Bob would like to share $|\phi_{G_1 G_2}\rangle^{\otimes n}$.
- Alice would like to send the message pair (m, m') .
- The encoder generates local randomness elements, k and k' , uniformly at random.
- Apply $F_{G_1^n \rightarrow A^n}^{(x^n)}$ and $U(\gamma)$, with $x^n = x^n(m, k)$ and $\gamma \equiv \gamma(m', k' | x^n)$ on G_1^n (Alice's resource).
- ★ Message-average analyses are based on the quantum packing lemma (error) and covering lemma (security).

Achievability Proof Outline (Cont.)

To show the maximal error/security criteria, we modify the technique of [Cai, 2004] (originally applied to classical MAC's):

- ★ **Guaranteed message:** Expurgate the worst λ fraction of messages, to get a rate of $R - \frac{1}{n} \log((1 - \lambda)^{-1})$, which tends to R as $n \rightarrow \infty$.
- ★ **Excess message:**
 - Selects a uniform "key" $L \in [1 : n^2]$.
 - Choose a permutation π_L on the message set $[1 : 2^{nR'}]$, and encode the message pair $(m_0, m'_0) = (m, \pi_L(m'))$ using the codebook \mathcal{C} .
 - Bob obtains an estimate, \hat{L} and (\hat{m}_0, \hat{m}'_0) , and then declares his estimation for the original messages as $\hat{m} = \hat{m}_0$ and $\hat{m}' = \pi_{\hat{L}}^{-1}(\hat{m}'_0)$.

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Achievability Proof Outline (Cont.)

Error Analysis:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{E} \left[P_e^{(n)}(\Pi(\mathcal{C})|m, m') \right] &= \sum_{\bar{m}'} \Pr(\Pi_{\ell'}(m') = \bar{m}') P_e^{(n)}(\mathcal{C}|m, \bar{m}') \\ &= \frac{1}{2^{nR'}} \sum_{\bar{m}'} P_e^{(n)}(\mathcal{C}|m, \bar{m}') \leq \lambda\end{aligned}$$

Then, by the Chernoff bound,

$$\Pr \left(\frac{1}{n^2} \sum_{\ell'=1}^{n^2} P_e^{(n)}(\Pi(\mathcal{C})|m, m') > 4\lambda \right) < e^{-\lambda n^2}$$

Since the bound is super-exponential, the maximal error probability vanishes.

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$$\mathcal{N}(\rho) = (1 - \epsilon)\rho + \epsilon |e\rangle\langle e|$$

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
Example: Amplitude Damping Channel

Qubit Amplitude Damping channel

$$\mathcal{N}(\rho) = K_0 \rho K_0^\dagger + K_1 \rho K_1^\dagger$$

with

$$K_0 = |0\rangle\langle 0| + \sqrt{1-\gamma}|1\rangle\langle 1|, K_1 = \sqrt{\gamma}|0\rangle\langle 1|, \quad \gamma \in [0, 1]$$



Example: Amplitude Damping Channel (Cont.)

Achievability: Quantum Superposition State

Set

$$|u_\beta\rangle \equiv \sqrt{1-\beta}|0\rangle \otimes |0\rangle + \sqrt{\beta}|1\rangle \otimes |1\rangle$$

with


$$0 \leq \beta \leq p$$

and the encoding scheme:

$$\rho_X = (1-q, q) \quad , \quad \mathcal{F}^{(x)}(\rho) \equiv \sum_X^x \rho \Sigma_X^x \quad , \quad x \in \{0, 1\}$$

Example: Amplitude Damping Channel (Cont.)

Figure: Achievable region for $\gamma = 0.3$.



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- While the setting resembles layered secrecy broadcast models, the analysis is much more involved, and the formulas have a different form.

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[Lederman and Pereg, 2024] arXiv:2401.12861 **[quant-ph]** - Interception Model

[Lederman and Pereg, 2024] arXiv:2404.12880 **[quant-ph]** - Passive Model

Thank you